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1 
FILTER WARS:  THE FIGHT TO DETERMINE 
FILTERING RIGHTS UNDER THE FAMILY 
MOVIE ACT AND THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM 
COPYRIGHT ACT 
Amanda A. Garcia 
The development of filtering and streaming technology over the last 
twenty years has put in to question the purpose and intent of legislation 
meant to encompass those technologies.  This Comment considers the exclu-
sive rights of copyright owners in their protected works, and the circumven-
tion of the encryptions placed on DVD and Blu-Ray discs to prevent the un-
authorized decryption, filtering, and streaming of those works.  This 
Comment will weigh the rights of creators of expressive works, such as films 
and television shows, against the rights of the purchasers to filter the works.  
A new defense to circumvention liability will be raised and rejected by the 
Ninth Circuit, and this Comment will conclude by explaining why the rights 
of purchasers should come secondary to the rights of copyright owners.  Fi-
nally, this Comment will clarify why it is essential to the public interest that 
filtering and streaming services comply with current interpretations of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act and the Family Movie Act, and will pro-
pose alternative solutions to avoid liability under these statutes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
J.D. Candidate at Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, 2019. The author would like to thank the 
members of the Editorial Board of the Entertainment Law Review of Loyola Law School, Los 
Angeles for their assistance in publishing this Comment. The author would also like to thank her 
parents, Rachel Heredia-Garcia and Gilbert Garcia, for their continued support, guidance, and en-
couragement throughout the years. 
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You no longer have to accept the unacceptable in movies and TV. 
Want to skip the nudity in Game of Thrones? Go ahead. Don’t 
like the mature language in Stranger Things? Mute it. Want less 
blood and gore in Hacksaw Ridge? VidAngel lets you skip and 
mute any objectionable content, all in the privacy of your home.1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Star Wars is still Star Wars, even without Princess Leia’s bikini 
scene,” said Judge Huritz, who presided over a recent Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals (“Circuit Court”) case that addressed the issue of whether a filtering 
service would survive to last another day or have its streaming business per-
manently enjoined.2  VidAngel, Inc. (“VidAngel”) recently filed suit in a 
United States District Court (“District Court”) against four Hollywood stu-
dios, seeking a declaration as to each of its lawful services after a series of 
losses in Los Angeles federal court.3  This series of lawsuits began when 
Disney Enterprises, Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Film 
Corporation, and Warner Bros. Entertainment, Inc. (the “Studios”) filed for 
an injunction against VidAngel’s “family-friendly” streaming service, which 
filtered movies and television shows for objectionable content like sex, vio-
lence, language, and nudity over existing streaming services like Amazon, 
Netflix, and HBO GO.4  The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected VidAn-
gel’s fair use and Family Movie Act defenses to copyright infringement and 
circumvention liability, and granted the injunction in favor of the Studios.5  
                                                          
1. VIDANGEL, https://www.vidangel.com/ [https://perma.cc/773W-7USH] (“You can skip 
or mute content from entire categories, like Language or Violence.  You can skip or mute content 
from sub-categories, such as profanity, or only the graphic violence portion of the Violence cate-
gory.  You can skip or mute content using individual filters, including specific words, or certain 
scenes.”).  
2. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 861 (9th Cir. 2017).   
3. Ben Winslow, VidAngel Sues Studios, Asking Judge to Declare Its Movie Filtering Meth-
ods Legal, FOX 13 (Sept. 2, 2017, 9:52 AM), http://fox13now.com/2017/09/02/vidangel-sues-stu-
dios-asking-judge-to-declare-its-movie-filtering-methods-legal/ [https://perma.cc/TT8L-KX4U]. 
4.  Id.; Gene Maddaus, Judge Orders VidAngel to Shut Down, VARIETY (Dec. 12, 2016, 
7:15 PM), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/vidangel-shut-down-copyright-violation-
1201940368/ [https://perma.cc/BY3V-B67T].  
5.  Ben Winslow, Federal Appeals Court Upholds Injunction Against VidAngel’s Stream-
ing Service, FOX 13 (Aug. 24, 2017, 2:48 PM), http://fox13now.com/2017/08/24/federal-appeals-
court-upholds-injunction-against-vidangels-streaming-service/ [https://perma.cc/E83J-GKEL].  
GARCIA_MACROS VER.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  11:43 AM 
2019] FILTER WARS 3 
VidAngel’s appeal presented two issues of first impression: (1) “whether 
the Family Movie Act of 2005 exempt[ed] VidAngel from liability for cop-
yright infringement;” and (2) whether the anti-circumvention provision of 
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act covered the Studios’ technological 
protection measures, which controlled both the access to and the use of the 
copyrighted works.6 
While VidAngel adamantly maintains that it provides the option of 
cleaner content to families in the privacy of their homes, the Circuit Court 
ultimately decided that allowing VidAngel’s services to thrive would create 
a loophole in existing copyright law and provide no recourse to copyright 
owners where infringing copies originated from a lawful source.7  VidAngel 
now stands to lose its business in the face of the injunction: 
VidAngel has just filed a petition for Chapter 11 protection to 
pause the Los Angeles lawsuit in order to reorganize its business 
around [a] new streaming model.  VidAngel is still up and running 
and generating millions in revenue . . . . Chapter 11 is simply a 
reorganization and part of our legal and business strategy.  Per 
federal law, Chapter 11 reorganization automatically pauses our 
lawsuit with Disney and the other plaintiffs . . . . VidAngel is not 
going away.8 
Part II of this Comment provides the legal background from which this 
case draws its authority, covering the purpose of copyright law, defenses to 
copyright infringement, and unlawful circumvention.  Furthermore, Part II 
provides examples of relevant case law and legislative interpretation that of-
fers contextual background for the case at hand.  Part III provides a summary 
of the factual background surrounding the case, delving into the mechanics 
of VidAngel’s filtering and streaming service.  Part IV covers the procedural 
background of the District Court’s decision, and Part V examines the Circuit 
Court’s decision.  Finally, Part VI analyzes the reasons why VidAngel’s as-
sertions are misinterpretations of what copyright law was created to protect 
                                                          
6. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852.  
7. Winslow, supra note 5.  
8. Message from the VidAngel CEO Neal Harmon, VIDANGEL, https://blog.vidan-
gel.com/chapter11/ [https://perma.cc/42XR-XUGB] (“VidAngel has filed a petition for relief under 
Chapter 11 to pause the Los Angeles litigation in order to reorganize its business around its new 
streaming service that works with Netflix, Amazon and HBO (other services coming in the fu-
ture).”).  
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and provides alternatives to its current filtering and streaming service.  Part 
VI also examines the legislative history behind VidAngel’s arguments and 
offers a business model that can be utilized in place of VidAngel’s model.  
This Comment concludes by explaining why VidAngel’s service is unlawful, 
and why failing to enjoin it would have been a detriment to copyright law 
and a burden on all United States copyright owners—from entertainment ti-
tans, like the Studios, to the most modest of freelance artists. 
II. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT LAW 
A. The Copyright Act: Exclusive Rights and the Fair Use Defense 
The United States Copyright Act (the “Copyright Act”) gives copyright 
owners the exclusive right to use or authorize others to use their copyrighted 
works, including the right to reproduce and publicly perform their copy-
righted works.9  In order to constitute a “copy” for purposes of the exclusive 
reproduction right under the Copyright Act, an “infringing work must be 
fixed in some tangible form, ‘from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device.’”10  A “public performance” under the Copyright Act occurs 
when someone “transmits or otherwise communicates a performance or dis-
play of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or process.”11  
Anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights held by the copyright owner 
of a work is considered to be a copyright infringer.12 
“Fair use” was enacted under the Copyright Act as an affirmative de-
fense to copyright infringement and provides for various non-infringing uses 
of an original work.13  The relevant portion of the statute reads: 
                                                          
9. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).  
10. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 970 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 
869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017); 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).  
11. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 
1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  
12. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (2002).  
13. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).  
GARCIA_MACROS VER.2 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/19/2019  11:43 AM 
2019] FILTER WARS 5 
[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work . . . for purposes such as crit-
icism, comment, news reporting, teaching [], scholarship, or re-
search, is not an infringement of a copyright.  In determining 
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair 
use[,] the factors to be considered shall include: (1) the purpose 
and character of the use, including whether such use is of a com-
mercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the 
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work.14 
Below is an explanation of the four fair use factors considered when a 
court evaluates a new work for potential copyright infringement. 
1. Purpose and Character of the Use 
The first fair use factor considers “the purpose and character of the use” 
and asks whether the new work is transformative in its own right, or whether 
it simply supplants the original work.15  Fair use favors new works that are 
created for non-commercial purposes, and which give new meaning, mes-
sage, or expression to the original work.16  The Circuit Court has held that 
works are transformative when “the works use copyrighted material for pur-
poses distinct from the purpose of the original material.”17  “Commercial use 
of copyrighted material is ‘presumptively an unfair exploitation’” of the ex-
clusive right that belongs solely to the copyright owner of the work.18 
                                                          
14. Id.  
15. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 972.  
16. Id. at 972–73.  
17. Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003).  
18. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 F.3d 522, 530 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Sony 
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).  
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2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second fair use factor considers “the nature of the copyrighted 
work”19 and the “value of the materials used.”20  This factor evaluates the 
nature of the work that has been copied, and asks whether it is “creative, 
imaginative, or represents an investment of time in anticipation of a financial 
return” by the original author.21  This factor examines whether the nature of 
the new work is highly creative or expressive, and what the value of the ma-
terials used were.22  Taking into consideration that some works are “closer 
to the core of intended copyright protection than others,” fair use favors more 
original and creative works.23 
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third fair use factor considers the quantity of the original work 
taken by the copy, and “the quality and importance of the portion taken.”24  
If the new work takes substantially from the original work, it is more difficult 
to claim fair use.25  The Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 
Inc. stated that the “verbatim copying of ‘a substantial portion of the infring-
ing work’ is a relevant inquiry” for this factor.26  The Court further explained 
that “a [new] work composed primarily of an original [work], particularly its 
heart, with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding 
use, fulfilling demand for the original [work].”27  Since “[t]he heart of a cop-
                                                          
19. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2).  
20. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (citing Folsom v. 
Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)).  
21. Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d Cir. 1992).  
22. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.  
23. Id.  
24. Id.; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.  
25. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.  
26. Id.; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587.  
27. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587–88.  
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yrighted work is the portion that is the ‘most likely to be…important in li-
censing serialization,’”28 copying the “heart” of a copyrighted work weighs 
against a fair use determination.29 
4. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for or Value of the 
Copyrighted Work 
The fourth fair use factor considers “current market harm and ‘whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defend-
ant…would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ 
for the original.”30  “The Ninth Circuit has held that when ‘the intended use 
is for commercial gain,’ the likelihood of market harm ‘may be pre-
sumed.’”31  This factor considers whether the new work will replace or sub-
stantially impact the demand for the original work in the market, which 
weighs against a finding of fair use.32 
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (the “DMCA”) was introduced 
in 1999 to address, among other things, the circumvention of copyright pro-
tection systems,33  and was “designed to facilitate the robust development 
and world-wide expansion of electronic commerce, communications, re-
search, development, and education in the digital age.”34  Known as the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) provides 
that “[n]o person shall circumvent a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work” protected by the Copyright Act.35  A technological 
measure “effectively controls access to a copyrighted work” under the 
                                                          
28. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587.  
29. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; see Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 587; Passport Video, 
349 F.3d at 630; L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo, 973 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992).  
30. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590.  
31. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Leadsinger, Inc., 512 F.3d at 531.  
32. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974.  
33. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).  
34. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 1–2 (1998).  
35. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A).  
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DMCA if “the measure, in the ordinary course of its operation, requires the 
application of information, or a process or a treatment, with the authority of 
the copyright owner, to gain access to the work.”36  The term “circumven-
tion” refers to the decryption of an encrypted work without the authority of 
the copyright owner.37  Section 1201(a)(3)(A) “exempts from circumvention 
liability only ‘those whom a copyright owner authorizes to circumvent an 
access control measure, not those whom a copyright owner authorizes to ac-
cess the work.’”38  In other words, the exemption applies only to those who 
have the authority to decrypt the encrypted work, such as a valid licensee, 
not to those who have the authority to view the work, such as a valid pur-
chaser of a DVD or Blu-ray disc.39  If a movie studio encrypts a DVD “so 
that it cannot be copied without special software . . . and an individual uses 
his own software to ‘crack’ the encryption and make copies without permis-
sion, the studio may pursue the copier both for infringement under the Cop-
yright Act, and separately, for his circumvention of the encryption . . . under 
the DMCA.”40 
C. The Family Movie Act 
The Family Movie Act of 2005 (the “FMA”) was passed in the wake 
of litigation against two filtering companies, CleanFlicks, LLC (“Clean-
Flicks”) and ClearPlay, Inc. (“ClearPlay”).41  The FMA was meant to pro-
vide an exemption from copyright infringement, and to allow families to 
                                                          
36. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(B).  
37. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863.  
38. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863 (quoting Murphy v. Millen-
nium Radio Grp., L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2011)).  
39. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863 (quoting Murphy, 650 F.3d 
at 300).  
40. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(3)(A); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 864 (quoting Murphy, 650 F.3d 
at 300).  
41. Brief for the Copyright Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 23, Disney 
Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).  
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control what they watched in the privacy of their own homes.42  The condi-
tions underlying this exemption are that (1) a service can only provide filter-
ing “by or at the direction of a member of a private household,” (2) the fil-
tering must be “a performance in or transmitted to that household for private 
home viewing,” (3) the filtering service must not create a “fixed copy of the 
altered version,” and (4) the filtering must be “from an authorized copy of 
the work.”43 
In Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, multiple film studios and 
executives sought an injunction against CleanFlicks for the unauthorized re-
production, filtration, and distribution of their copyrighted works.44  Clean-
Flicks sold and rented out DVD and VHS copies of films that had been fil-
tered to remove objectionable content like sex, profanity, and violence:45   
With this simple technology, a consumer would buy an original 
tape or a disk of a movie that had some objectionable content and 
give it to [CleanFlicks], or [CleanFlicks] would buy the movie 
upon request by the customer.  For a small fee, [CleanFlicks’s] 
personnel previewed the movie and marked the timing of objec-
tionable content.  The original video was then re-recorded on a 
new tape or disk while removing objectionable content as seam-
lessly as possible, by suspending recording for the time of objec-
tionable content, muting the audio input for this time, or replacing 
the content with ambient noise.  No additional content was ever 
added to the final product.46 
The Clean Flicks of Colo. court refused to apply the FMA exemption 
to CleanFlicks’s service because it made “fixed copies of altered works” and 
                                                          
42. Brief for U.S. Representatives John Hostettler and Spencer Bachus as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Defendant-Appellant at 11–12, Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 
(9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).  
43. 17 U.S.C. § 110(11) (2005).  
44. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D. Colo. 2006).  
45. Id. at 1237–38; see also Larry Williams, Cleaning Up Hollywood: Sanitized Tapes, 
DVDs Have Directors Crying Foul, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 1, 2002), http://articles.chicagotrib-
une.com/2002-10-01/features/0210010145_1_dvds-religious-audience-hollywood-studios 
[https://perma.cc/2GAH-63SX].  
46. Mark D. Shtilerman, Who Can Clean the Flick?: On Remedies for Infringement of Un-
used Derivative Works, 55 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 497, 503–04 (2008). 
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resold those unauthorized copies.47  The court granted the injunction, and 
CleanFlicks’s business was effectively shut down.48 
In Huntsman v. Soderbergh, ClearPlay survived an injunction by dis-
tinguishing itself from filtering services like CleanFlicks.49  Instead of resell-
ing filtered versions of copyrighted works, ClearPlay offers filtering soft-
ware that works in conjunction with a consumer’s lawful purchase of a 
streaming service or physical disc.50  For a monthly fee, customers can pur-
chase ClearPlay’s software, which cuts objectionable scenes and sounds 
from a DVD while a work is playing on a computer.51  ClearPlay also offers 
DVD players for purchase that are pre-equipped with this software.52  The 
                                                          
47. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1240. Cf. Williams, supra note 45 (“‘It is 
unconscionable, and unethical, to take someone else’s hard work, alter it and profit from it,’ said 
Oscar-winning director Steven Soderbergh, a vice president of [Directors Guild of America],” 
equating CleanFlicks’s services to “ripping pages out of a book, leaving the author’s name on it[,] 
and then [re-]selling it[.]”).   
48. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44.  
49. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. CIV.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1–
2 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005); Marius Meland, ClearPlay Cleared in Copyright Suit, LAW360 (Aug. 
21, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/3913/clearplay-cleared-in-copyright-suit 
[https://perma.cc/N7SJ-4AMQ].  
50. See Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1–2; see also Meland, supra note 49 
(ClearPlay’s website states that it “only releases filtering products that are compliant with copyright 
law.  Keeping our products legal is one of the reasons we have stayed in business for over 17 years.  
ClearPlay pioneered legal filtering of DVDs and Blu-ray, and is now pioneering legal filtering of 
streaming movies.”).  
51. Williams, supra note 45 (“ClearPlay sells a software program for $9.95 a month that 
cuts sounds and scenes from DVDs played on a computer….A ClearPlay-equipped DVD player is 
available for $699.88.”); CLEARPLAY, https://amazon.clearplay.com/  [https://perma.cc/ZB9U-
Z7FM].  
52. Williams, supra note 45; see also ClearPlay, supra note 51 (“ClearPlay filtering works 
while the movie is playing.”); David Pogue, State of the Art; Add ‘Cut’ and ‘Bleep’ To a DVD’s 
Options, N.Y. TIMES (May 27, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/27/technology/state-of-
the-art-add-cut-and-bleep-to-a-dvd-s-options.html  [https://perma.cc/4PUV-BNXS] (“It’s a sleek 
black super-thin machine with progressive-scan outputs[.]  The machine plays regular, unmodified 
commercial DVD’s.  It skips objectionable scenes based on software filters created by human edi-
tors and stored in its memory.  (It does not filter DVD bonus materials, homemade DVD’s or copies 
of DVD’s.)  The filters for 100 recent movies come installed[;] [y]ou have to pay for access to the 
other 500 filters[.] To mask bad language, the player momentarily mutes the soundtrack[;] [t]o filter 
out violence, sex and ‘disturbing images,’ [] the player simply skips ahead.”). 
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Huntsman court found that this technology was exempt from infringement 
under the FMA.53 
III. BACKGROUND OF RELEVANT FACTS 
A. The Studios 
The Studios are all in the business of producing and distributing copy-
righted motion pictures and television programs (the “works”).54  The Stu-
dios invest a considerable amount of effort and resources each year to de-
velop their works, and own the exclusive rights within the United States to 
reproduce and publicly perform them, including the exclusive rights to 
stream the works over the Internet to the public.55  The Studios distribute and 
license their works for home entertainment over various channels, including 
“(1) physical Discs; (2) digital download through services like iTunes, 
VUDU or Amazon Video; (3) on-demand streaming for short-term viewing 
on a per transaction fee (e.g., iTunes Store or Google Play Store); or (4) sub-
scription on-demand streaming (e.g., Netflix or Hulu).”56  The Studios often 
negotiate higher licensing fees in exchange for granting licensees the exclu-
sive right to show the works to the public during a specific time period.57  
These online and digital distribution licenses are a large source of revenue 
for the Studios.58 
B. Technological Protection Measures 
The Studios place technological protection measures (“TPMs”) on their 
works to protect them from unauthorized access and copying.59  TPMs, such 
                                                          
53. Huntsman, 2005 WL 1993421, at *1–2; Meland, supra note 49.  
54. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 852–53 (9th Cir. 2017); Disney 
Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 964 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 869 F.3d 848 (9th 
Cir. 2017).  
55. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.  
56. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.  
57. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.  
58. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 852–53; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.  
59. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 853.  
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as Content Scramble System (“CSS”) and Advanced Access Content System 
(“AACS”), control access to the copyrighted content on DVD and Blu-ray 
discs.60  This access control allows consumers to watch or playback the con-
tent, but not copy the content.61  The DVD Copy Control Association (“DVD 
CCA”) licenses the CSS technology to protect works on DVDs, while the 
Advanced Access Content System Licensing Administrator, LLC (“AACS 
LA”) develops and licenses the AACS encryption-based technology to pro-
tect high-definition content on Blu-ray disks.62  CSS and AACS are consid-
ered “technological measures that effectively control[] access to a work” for 
the purposes of the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA, and circum-
vention of these technologies is prohibited.63 
The use of TPMs began as the digital revolution was emerging in the 
late 1990s.64  The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) gath-
ered participating countries and agreed that each country “would enact legal 
prohibitions against the circumvention of technological protection measures 
employed to protect copyrighted materials against unauthorized access and 
use.”65  From provisions of these WIPO treaties, the United States Congress 
birthed what is now the DMCA.66  Congress noted that the new law was 
created to “support new ways of disseminating copyrighted materials to us-
ers, and . . . safeguard the availability of legitimate uses of those materials 
by individuals.”67 
                                                          
60. Id.  
61. Id.  
62. Brief of DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. and Advance Access Content System 
License Administrator, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 2, Disney En-
ters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).  
63. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1999); Brief of DVD Copy Control Ass’n, supra note 62, 
at 3; see Realnetworks, Inc. v. DVD Copy Control Ass’n, 641 F. Supp. 2d 913, 919 (N.D. Cal. 
2009); Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
64. Brief of DVD Copy Control Ass’n, supra note 62, at 4.  
65. Id.; see World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty art. 18, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 (1997); see also World Intellectual 
Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-17 
(1997).  
66. Brief of DVD Copy Control Ass’n, supra note 62, at 4.  
67. Id. at 4–5 (citation omitted).  
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CSS was the first technology developed for this purpose to be applied 
to the movie content stored on the then-new DVD discs.68  CSS originated 
from a large team of experts “from motion picture, consumer electronics, and 
information technology companies,” who converged to propose a “scram-
bling technology and a set of standardized rules regarding compliance with 
particular requirements” that would govern the technology.69  The team’s 
forward thinking produced “a set of technical specifications and a set of se-
curity requirements licensed under a licensing agreement requiring compa-
nies building DVD players to comply with those rules in order to build com-
pliant products that would be permitted to decrypt the content recorded on 
the DVD disks.”70  These technical specifications and security requirements 
have been adopted industry-wide, and the DVD CCA now “licenses the 
method for studios and other content companies to protect their content using 
CSS on DVDs.”71 
In the early 2000s, when technology advanced to high-definition dis-
plays, the companies from the three industries again worked together, as en-
visioned by Congress, to create what is now the Blu-ray disc.72  AACS tech-
nology was created and licensed by AACS LA to provide encryption 
protection to digital content on Blu-ray discs, similar to the way CSS was 
developed to provide protection from circumvention on DVDs.73  Individual 
purchasers of DVDs and Blu-ray discs are not provided “the keys or other 
cryptographic secrets” necessary for playback of the content on the discs.74  
Instead, they must use a licensed DVD or Blu-ray disc player, which in turn 
“must abide by the technical specifications and security requirements im-
posed by the licenses from DVD CCA or AACS LA.”75  Neither the CSS or 
AACS license allows copying of the content onto a hard drive or other device 
                                                          
68. Id. at 5.  
69. Id.  
70. Id. at 5–6.  
71. Id. at 6.  
72. Id. at 7.  
73. Id. at 24.  
74. Id. at 9.  
75. Id.  
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for storage, or distribution of the content from the discs over the internet.76  
VidAngel operates by circumventing these access control measures on the 
discs in order to copy, store, reproduce, and distribute the content over the 
internet to the public without the Studios’ authorization. 
C. VidAngel’s Service 
VidAngel offers customers the option to remove objectionable content 
from existing movies and TV shows by selecting from categories such as 
sex, violence, or language.77  The customer’s selections prompt VidAngel to 
cut a sex scene entirely from a film, or mute all of the profanity in a television 
show.78  VidAngel operates by lawfully purchasing physical DVDs and Blu-
ray discs for each title it offers.79  It uses a “commercially available software 
program” to decrypt and copy each disc, removes the TPMs, and then up-
loads the digital copy to a computer.80  After decryption, the works are con-
verted into http live-streaming format and broken into segments that are 
tagged for eighty different categories of inappropriate content.81   
To watch a particular movie or television show, a new customer must 
log in to the VidAngel website to establish their unique user ID, and purchase 
a physical DVD or Blu-ray disc containing the work.82  Once a customer 
purchases a work, “the disc is removed from [VidAngel’s] inventory and the 
title is transferred to that customer’s unique user ID.”83  VidAngel “typically 
maintains possession of the physical [disc] on behalf of the purchasers, but 
                                                          
76. Id.  
77. Todd Spangler, Legally Embattled VidAngel Movie-Streaming Site Raises $10 Million 
From Fans, VARIETY (Nov. 10, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/vidangel-raises-10-
million-studio-copyright-lawsuit-1201914823/ [https://perma.cc/6W9J-XXEF].  
78. See Spangler, supra note 77; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964–65.  
79. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 853.  
80. Id.; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.  
81. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 853.  
82. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964.  
83. Id.  
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purchasers may request that the [disc] be sent to them or retrieve the [disc] 
from VidAngel’s offices.”84 
After purchasing the work, a customer selects objectionable content he 
or she would like to remove from among the eighty categories available.85  
Each customer must apply at least one filter in order to view a work.86  The 
filtered version of the work can then be streamed to the customer on any 
VidAngel-supported device, “including Roku, Apple TV, Smart TV, Ama-
zon Fire TV, Android, Chromecast, iPad/iPhone and desktop or laptop com-
puters.”87  The price for each individual work is $20, but the customer may 
sell the work back to VidAngel for partial credit.88  VidAngel’s discs are sold 
over and over again in this manner,89 such that the content on one disc can 
be resold multiple times to different customers (e.g., instead of three people 
purchasing three separate discs of the same work, VidAngel purchases one 
disc and makes its content available to three people, effectively reducing the 
Studios’ profit by two purchases). 
Within a year of its launch, VidAngel’s customer base grew from 4,848 
users to over 100,000 monthly active users.90  By the time the Studios filed 
suit to enjoin VidAngel’s services, VidAngel was offering more than 2,500 
movies and television shows to the public for purchase on its website—more 
than eighty of which were the Studios’ works.91  For example, VidAngel 
                                                          
84. Id.  
85. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 854.  
86. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 965. 
87. Id.  
88. Id. at 964–65 (“Once a user has viewed a stream, the user may re-sell the DVD back to 
VidAngel for a partial credit of the $20 purchase price.  The sellback price decreases $1 per night 
for standard definition (SD) purchases and $2 per night for high-definition (HD) purchases.  Once 
a user sells the movie back to VidAngel, the user’s access to the title is terminated and the remaining 
balance is credited back to the user’s VidAngel account.  For example:  A $20 SD disk is owned 
for 2 nights at $1 per night and sold back for $18 in sell-back credit.  If a VidAngel customer keeps 
a DVD for more than 20 days, he or she can either view it through the VidAngel platform in per-
petuity, sell it back for $1 or $2 in credit, or VidAngel will send the DVD to the customer, if 
requested.”).  
89. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 854.  
90. Id. at 854–55.  
91. Id. at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 964–65.  
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began streaming Disney’s movie Star Wars: The Force Awakens while it 
was lawfully only available for purchase on DVD or as a digital download.92  
Likewise, VidAngel began streaming Fox’s movies The Martian and Brook-
lyn while they were licensed exclusively to HBO for on-demand streaming.93  
VidAngel was not authorized by the Studios to copy, perform, or access any 
of these works.94 
IV. THE DISTRICT COURT FOUND THAT VIDANGEL’S SERVICES 
VIOLATED THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION OF THE DMCA 
AND INFRINGED ON THE STUDIOS’ EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS TO REPRODUCE 
AND PUBLICLY PERFORM THEIR WORKS 
In June 2016, the Studios filed suit against VidAngel seeking a prelim-
inary injunction of VidAngel’s services.95  The Studios’ complaint alleged 
copyright infringement in violation of their exclusive reproduction and pub-
lic performance rights, and circumvention of TPMs in violation of the anti-
circumvention provision of the DMCA.96  In granting an injunction, the Dis-
trict Court considered (1) whether each of the Studios’ claims were likely to 
succeed on their merits; (2) whether the Studios were likely to suffer irrepa-
rable harm if the injunction was not granted; (3) whether the balance of hard-
ship tipped in favor of the Studios; and (4) whether the injunction was in the 
public interest.97 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
92. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 854.  
93. Id.  
94. Id. at 855.  
95. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 855 (9th Cir. 2017); Disney En-
ters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d 957, 965 (C.D. Cal. 2016), aff’d, 869 F.3d 848 (9th 
Cir. 2017).  
96. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 963.  
97. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856 (citing Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 
7, 20 (2008)).  
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A. VidAngel’s Violation of the Anti-Circumvention Provision of the 
DMCA 
The DMCA states that “to ‘circumvent a technological measure’ means 
to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or otherwise 
to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, 
without the authority of the copyright owner.”98  The purchase of a DVD or 
Blu-ray disc does not give the purchaser the authority to decrypt the TPMs 
on the discs.99  In fact, courts have previously determined that “the purchase 
of a DVD only conveys the authority to view the DVD, not to decrypt it.”100  
VidAngel conceded that it used a “commercially available software 
program” to decrypt the TPMs on the Studios’ discs, and failed to provide 
evidence that the Studios had explicitly or implicitly authorized DVD or Blu-
ray purchasers, including VidAngel, to circumvent the TPMs on their discs 
in order to view the works on a platform such as VidAngel’s streaming ser-
vice.101  Thus, the District Court found that VidAngel violated the anti-cir-
cumvention provision of the DMCA by decrypting and removing the TPMs 
that controlled access to the Studios’ copyrighted works on DVDs and Blu-
ray discs.102 
B. VidAngel’s Copyright Infringement 
VidAngel’s circumvention of the TPMs on the Studios’ discs allowed 
it to create unauthorized digital copies of each work, resulting in a copyright 
infringement action.103  To succeed in its copyright infringement claim, the 
Studios were required to show that they had valid copyright ownership in the 
works and that VidAngel violated one or more of the Studios’ exclusive 
rights as copyright owners.104  The District Court found that the Studios had 
demonstrated ownership of the copyrighted works by providing certificates 
                                                          
98. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999).  
99. 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1096 (N.D. Cal. 2004).  
100. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 967.  
101. Id.  
102. Id.  
103. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 966–69.  
104. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969; see 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2002).  
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of registration issued by the United States Copyright Office.105  Since a cer-
tificate of registration is “prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright 
and of the facts stated in the certificate,”106 the only factor at issue was 
whether VidAngel violated one of the Studios’ exclusive rights under 17 
U.S.C. § 106.107 
1. VidAngel Violated the Studios’ Exclusive Right to Reproduce 
Their Works 
The Copyright Act grants copyright owners the exclusive right “to re-
produce the copyrighted work” under § 106(1).108  In MAI Systems Corp. v. 
Peak Computer, Inc., the Circuit Court held that transferring digital work 
“‘from a permanent storage device to a computer’s RAM [or storage]’ in-
fringes the reproduction right.”109  As the District Court noted, while 
“the MAI Sys. Corp. decision addressed the infringement of computer soft-
ware, the same analysis applies to the digital transfer [of] other types of cop-
yrighted work.”110  VidAngel admitted to making copies of the Studios’ 
works “onto a computer system and third-party servers.”111  VidAngel de-
crypted the discs, created “intermediate” files that it tagged for over eighty 
types of objectionable content, broke them into approximately 1,300 frag-
ments, and then encrypted those fragments and stored them in “a secure, ac-
cess-controlled location in the cloud.”112  The Ninth Circuit has previously 
specified that “on its face, the language of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) unambigu-
ously encompasses and proscribes ‘intermediate copying.’”113  In order to 
                                                          
105. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969.  
106. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1976).  
107. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969; see 17 U.S.C. § 106.  
108. 17 U.S.C § 106(1).  
109. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 969 (quoting MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, 
Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993)).  
110. Id.  
111. Id.  
112. Id.  
113. Id. at 970 (quoting Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 
1992)).  
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constitute a “copy” under the Copyright Act, the “infringing work must be 
fixed in some tangible form, ‘from which the work can be perceived, repro-
duced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a ma-
chine or device.’”114  Because VidAngel’s fragmented copies were able to be 
perceived with the aid of VidAngel’s software, the District Court found that 
VidAngel’s service amounted to copyright infringement for violating the 
Studios’ exclusive right to copy and reproduce its own works.115 
2. VidAngel Violated the Studios’ Exclusive Right to Publicly 
Perform Their Own Works 
Under § 106(4), copyright owners are also granted the exclusive right 
“to perform [their] copyrighted work[s] publicly.”116  A “public perfor-
mance” is when someone “transmits or otherwise communicates a perfor-
mance or display of the work . . . to the public, by means of any device or 
process.”117  A transmission is made to the public if “the relationship between 
. . . the transmitter of the performance, and the audience . . . is a commercial, 
‘public’ relationship[,] regardless of where the viewing takes place.”118   
While VidAngel asserted that its service did not engage in unlawful 
public performances “because [it] stream[ed] filtered versions of motion pic-
tures created at the direction of and owned by its customers,” the District 
Court maintained that VidAngel’s customers were never the lawful owners 
of the digital content streamed via VidAngel’s service.119  The ownership 
granted to the lawful purchaser of a DVD or Blu-ray disc extends only to the 
physical disc, not to the digital content on the disc.120  Furthermore, VidAn-
gel streamed the works from a master copy stored on its server, not from a 
                                                          
114. Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1518; see 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010).  
115. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970.  
116. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4).  
117. 17 U.S.C. § 101; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (quoting Warner Bros. Entm’t, 
Inc. v. WTV Sys., 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011)).  
118. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970 (quoting Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 
1010).  
119. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 970–71.  
120. Id.  
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disc lawfully purchased and owned by the customer.121  In other words, own-
ership of a DVD or Blu-ray disc only gives a purchaser authorization to view 
the content on the DVD or Blu-ray disc, “not to decrypt it for the purpose of 
viewing it on an alternative platform” like VidAngel’s streaming service.122  
Therefore, the District Court held that VidAngel had unlawfully streamed 
unauthorized copies of the Studios’ works to the public in violation of the 
Studios’ exclusive public performance rights.123  The District Court con-
cluded by stating that the Studios’ had a strong likelihood of success on their 
copyright infringement claim.124 
C. VidAngel’s FMA Defense 
VidAngel denied copyright infringement and violation of the anti-cir-
cumvention provisions of the DMCA, and instead raised two defenses to the 
Studios’ claims: (1) legal authorization under the FMA, and (2) fair use.125  
The District Court found that “[n]either the plain language nor the legislative 
history of the FMA support VidAngel’s position,”126 and pointed out that, in 
fact, the legislative history directly contradicts VidAngel’s assertion “that 
the FMA provides an exemption to the anti-circumvention provisions of the 
DMCA.”127  Senator Orrin Hatch, who introduced the FMA to the United 
States Senate, specified that the FMA does not provide any exemption or 
defense to the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.128  In other words, 
the FMA has not been recognized as a defense to unlawful circumvention 
under the DMCA.  Instead, the FMA provides an exemption from copyright 
infringement for filtering limited portions of movies and creating a computer 
                                                          
121. Id.  
122. Id.  
123. Id.  
124. Id.  
125. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 971–74.  
126. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 968.  
127. Id.  
128. 150 CONG. REC. 11,852, at S11,853 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch).  
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program or other technology that enables filtering, like ClearPlay’s technol-
ogy, so long as (1) the filtration is done by or at the direction of a member of 
a private household, (2) the performance or transmission of the filtered work 
comes from an authorized copy of the movie, and (3) no fixed copy of the 
filtered version is created by the computer or other technology, meaning it is 
not stored on a computer, device, or in the cloud.129 
Here, the District Court held that VidAngel streamed the works to its 
customers from an unauthorized copy, because it streamed from a digital 
copy that it acquired by circumventing TPMs on the Studios’ discs in viola-
tion of the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.130  In other words, 
because VidAngel unlawfully decrypted the discs instead of lawfully acquir-
ing a license from the Studios to decrypt the discs, its performance and re-
production of those works were unauthorized.  Further, the court found that 
the authorization requirement is a “clear indication that the FMA is not in-
tended to displace a copyright holder’s exclusive reproduction right.”131 
Additionally, the District Court rejected VidAngel’s argument “that a 
filtering service that complies with the FMA, need not satisfy any other pro-
vision[] of the Copyright Act” because it was in direct contradiction to the 
last sentence of the FMA, which provides that “[n]othing in [the FMA] shall 
be construed to imply further rights under section 106 of [the Copyright 
Act], or to have any effect on defenses or limitations on rights granted under 
any other section of [the Copyright Act].”132  Thus, the District Court found 
that VidAngel’s service did not comply with the express language of the 
FMA, and that the FMA did not provide a defense to VidAngel’s copyright 
infringement.133 
                                                          
129. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2005); VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 971; VidAngel, Inc., 869 
F.3d at 857.  
130. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 971.  
131. Id. at 972.  
132. 17 U.S.C. § 110; VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 858; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 
972.  
133. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 972.  
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D. VidAngel’s Fair Use Defense 
1. Purpose and Character of the Use 
VidAngel asserted that its use of the Studios’ copyrighted works were 
fair use.134  The first fair use factor considers “the purpose and character of 
the use.”135  This factor asks “to what extent the new work is transformative” 
from the original, whether it supplants the original, and whether the new 
work’s purpose is commercial or not.136  The Supreme Court has held that a 
use is transformative if it “adds something new, with a further purpose or 
different character, altering the [original work] with new expression, mean-
ing, or message.”137  VidAngel admitted that its use was commercial and that 
it profited from the Studios’ works.138  However, VidAngel argued that its 
filtering service was transformative because it filtered the Studios’ works for 
at least one category of objectionable content before streaming them to 
VidAngel customers.139  The District Court rejected this argument, finding 
that “VidAngel’s service [did] not add anything to [the Studios’] works,” and 
“simply [omitted] portions” of the works.140  In Clean Flicks of Colo., the 
court rejected a fair use defense asserted by defendants who provided a ser-
vice similar to VidAngel’s service.141  The Clean Flicks of Colo. court ruled 
that the “defendants’ editing of objectionable content was not transformative 
because it added nothing to the copyrighted works, and only removed ‘a 
small percentage of most of the films.’”142   
                                                          
134. Id.  
135. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1992).  
136. Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 800 (9th Cir. 2003) (cit-
ing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)).  
137. Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 579.  
138. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 972.  
139. Id.  
140. Id.  
141. Id.  See generally Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 
(D. Colo. 2006).  
142. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.  
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The District Court found that VidAngel’s use of the Studios’ works 
served the “same intrinsic entertainment value that is protected by [the Stu-
dios’] copyrights,” and was therefore not transformative.143  VidAngel’s 
commercial use of the Studios’ works, “coupled with [the] non-transforma-
tive nature of the [filtered] copies weigh[ed] heavily in favor of the [Stu-
dios]” under the first fair use factor.144 
2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work 
The second fair use factor considers “the nature of the copyrighted 
work.”145  The Circuit Court has held that “works such as original . . . motion 
pictures . . . are creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core of 
copyright protection.”146  Thus, the District Court found that this factor 
weighed in the Studios’ favor. 
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
The third fair use factor considers the quantity and quality of the por-
tion taken from the original work by the copy.147  The District Court found 
that VidAngel copied the Studios’ works in their entirety.148  The court re-
jected VidAngel’s argument that customers would never watch exact copies 
of the original works because VidAngel required each user to apply at least 
one filter to a purchased work before viewing it.149  The District Court held 
that “[d]espite the fact that VidAngel’s service omits portions of each work, 
                                                          
143. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1241.  
144. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.  
145. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
146. Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003).  
147. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.  
148. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973.  
149. Id.  
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the essential storyline, cinematography, and acting portrayals remain un-
changed. These elements are the heart of the movie.”150  Thus, the third fair 
use factor weighed in favor of the Studios.151 
4. Effect of the Use on the Potential Market for or Value of the 
Copyrighted Work 
The fourth fair use factor considers “current market harm and ‘whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant 
. . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market’ 
for the original.”152  Furthermore, “[t]he Ninth Circuit has held that when 
‘the intended use is for commercial gain,’ the likelihood of market harm 
‘may be presumed.’”153  VidAngel asserted that the filtered versions of the 
works were not substitutes for the Studios’ original works.154  The District 
Court rejected this argument, stating that “the fact that VidAngel’s streams 
are ‘composed primarily’ of [the Studios’] works . . . with little added or 
changed makes the streams ’more likely to be a merely superseding use, ful-
filling demand for the original.’”155  Therefore, the District Court found the 
fourth fair use factor weighed in the Studios’ favor.156 
E. The District Court Granted a Preliminary Injunction in Favor of 
the Studios 
Having found that the Studios’ claims were likely to succeed on their 
merits and that VidAngel had failed to defend against the claims, the District 
Court next considered whether a preliminary injunction was appropriate.157 
                                                          
150. Id. at 973–74.  
151. Id. at 974.  
152. Id.; Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 590.  
153. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Publ’g, 512 
F.3d 522, 531 (9th Cir. 2008).  
154. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 973. 
155. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974; see Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 586.  
156. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 974.  
157. Id.  
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1. Likelihood of Imminent Irreparable Injury 
The Studios argued that VidAngel’s service interfered with their “basic 
right to control how, when and through which channels consumers can view 
their copyrighted works.”158  The District Court accepted this argument, find-
ing that VidAngel had operated an “infringing service without the normal 
licensing restrictions imposed by [the Studios],” and hence interfered with 
the Studios’ “ability to control the use and transmission of their [c]opy-
righted works, thereby, causing irreparable injury.”159  The Senior Vice Pres-
ident of Digital Distribution at 20th Century Fox Home Entertainment testi-
fied that the Studios’ exclusive rights “are critical to providing [the Studios] 
the opportunity to earn a return on their substantial investments” because the 
Studios exercise their rights through licensing agreements.160  The Studios 
argued that “[b]ecause VidAngel operate[d] without any license and per-
form[ed] [the Studios’] works during negotiated exclusivity periods[,] it in-
terfere[d] with [the Studios’] exercise of their exclusive rights and frus-
trate[d] [their] ability to negotiate for similar rights in the future.”161 
The Studios also claimed that VidAngel’s service threatened to harm 
the Studios’ “relationships and goodwill with authorized distributors by un-
dermining their ability to provide licensed offerings.”162  The Studios pointed 
out “that licensees have complained in partnership meetings, and especially 
in negotiations, that it is difficult to compete with services like VidAngel that 
do not act pursuant to licensing restrictions.”163  It is well established that 
harm to one’s negotiating position and goodwill with licensees is irreparable 
because it is “neither easily calculable, nor easily compensable.”164  There-
                                                          
158. Id. at 975.  
159. Id. (citing Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1012).  
160. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 975.  
161. Id.  
162. Id.  
163. Id. at 976.  
164. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys., PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 
1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012) (quoting Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1013).  
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fore, the District Court found that VidAngel’s service caused irreparable in-
jury because it undermined the Studios’ negotiating position with licensees 
and damaged their goodwill with licensees.165 
2. Balance of Hardships 
The District Court found that the balance of hardships tipped sharply 
in the Studios’ favor.166  The District Court disregarded VidAngel’s plea that 
an injunction would cause them “to suffer an unimaginable financial hard-
ship” because lost profits suffered from unlawful activity is an argument that 
“merits little equitable consideration.”167  The Circuit Court has previously 
held that a defendant “cannot complain of the harm that will befall it when 
[it is] properly forced to desist from its infringing activities.”168 
3. Public Interest 
The District Court found that a preliminary injunction was in the public 
interest.169  It pointed out that an injunction here “would not prevent VidAn-
gel or any other company from providing a filtering service similar to 
ClearPlay’s,” and thus would not “negatively impact the public interest in 
watching filtered content in private.”170  Furthermore, the court stated that it 
is “virtually axiomatic that the public interest can only be served by uphold-
ing copyright protections and correspondingly, preventing the misappropri-
ation of skills, creative energies, and resources [that have been] invested in 
the protected work.”171 
                                                          
165. VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 976.  
166. Id. at 977–78.  
167. Id. (citing Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express Co., 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 
1995)). 
168. Id.  
169. Id. at 978.  
170. Id.  
171. Id. (quoting Warner Bros., 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1015).  
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4. The District Court’s Decision 
VidAngel expressed that it would continue to offer the Studios’ works 
and other future releases, unless enjoined.172  Thus, after reviewing the fac-
tors, the District Court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the Stu-
dios.173  VidAngel was enjoined “from copying and ‘streaming, transmitting, 
or otherwise publicly performing or displaying any of [the Studios’] copy-
righted works,’ ‘circumventing technological measures protecting [the Stu-
dios’] copyrighted works,’ or ‘engaging in any other activity that violates, 
directly or indirectly’” the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA or the 
Studios’ exclusive use of their copyrighted works.174 
V. THE CIRCUIT COURT AFFIRMED THE DISTRICT COURT’S DECISION 
A. Copyright Infringement Claim 
When a defendant decrypts the TPMs on a work and then reproduces 
and publicly performs that work as VidAngel did, “it is liable for both cir-
cumvention in violation of § 1201(a)(1)(A) and copyright infringement in 
violation of § 106.”175  Here, the Circuit Court found that the District Court 
correctly concluded that VidAngel infringed on the Studios’ exclusive repro-
duction rights in their copyrighted works.176  The Circuit Court rejected 
VidAngel’s argument that it could lawfully re-sell or rent the works because 
it had lawfully purchased an original version from which it subsequently 
made edited copies.177  The Circuit Court cited to 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), which 
states that lawful owners of a particular copy of a copyrighted work are only 
entitled to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy, not to 
reproduce the work.178 
                                                          
172. Id. at 969.  
173. Id. at 979; see VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855. 
174. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 855; VidAngel, Inc., 224 F. Supp. 3d at 979.  
175. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 864 (9th Cir. 2017); see Murphy 
v. Millennium Radio Grp., L.L.C., 650 F.3d 295, 300 (3d Cir. 2011).  
176. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856.  
177.  Id. at 856–57.  
178. 17 U.S.C. § 109 (2008); VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 856–57.  
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B. DMCA Anti-Circumvention Violation Claim 
The Circuit Court additionally found that VidAngel violated the 
DMCA’s anti-circumvention provision by decrypting the access controls on 
the Studios’ discs without authorization.179  Decrypting an encrypted work, 
such as a movie on a DVD or Blu-ray disk, without the authorization of the 
copyright owner is circumvention.180 
VidAngel conceded that the CCS and AACS technologies on the Stu-
dios’ discs are TPMs which encrypt access controls to protect the copy-
righted works.181  These TPMs are placed on the discs to prevent circumven-
tion and allow copyright owners like the Studios to exercise their exclusive 
rights over their own works.  VidAngel admitted that it used software to de-
crypt these encrypted TPMs and effectively circumvented the access controls 
to the works.182  VidAngel argued, however, that “like all lawful purchasers, 
VidAngel is authorized by the Studios to decrypt [the TPMs] to view the 
discs’ content” and is therefore exempt from circumvention liability by sec-
tion 1201(a)(3)(A) of the DMCA.183  As previous noted, section 
1201(a)(3)(A) exempts from liability only those whom a copyright owner 
authorizes to circumvent the encrypted work, not those who have the author-
ity only to view the work.184  VidAngel argued that as a valid purchaser of 
the DVDs and Blu-ray disks with the authority to view the copyrighted 
works, VidAngel was exempt from liability because the Studios impliedly 
authorized it and all other lawful purchasers of the discs to circumvent the 
TPMs.185  In other words, VidAngel argued that because it lawfully pur-
chased a copy of each DVD, it had the authority to decrypt the DVDs.186  
This argument was addressed and rejected in MDY Industries, LLC v. Bliz-
zard Entertainment, Inc., which adopted the Second Circuit approach set 
                                                          
179. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863.  
180. Id.  
181. Id.  
182. Id.  
183. Id. (emphasis in original).  
184. Id.  
185. Id.  
186. Id.  
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forth in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley.187  Corley rejected the very 
argument that VidAngel made: “that an individual who buys a DVD has the 
‘authority of the copyright owner’ to view the DVD, and therefore is ex-
empted from the DMCA . . . when the buyer circumvents an encryption tech-
nology in order to view the DVD on a competing platform.”188  Instead, sec-
tion 1201(a)(3)(A) only exempts from circumvention liability those “who 
would ‘decrypt’ an encrypted DVD with the authority of a copyright owner, 
not those who would ‘view’ a DVD with the authority of a copyright 
owner.”189  Similar to the defendant in Corley, VidAngel “‘offered no evi-
dence that [the Studios] have either explicitly or implicitly authorized DVD 
buyers to circumvent encryption technology’ to access the digital contents 
of their discs.”190  Lawful purchasers “have permission only to view their 
purchased discs with a DVD or Blu-ray player licensed to decrypt the 
TPMs,” as intended by the exemption.191 
The Circuit Court likened VidAngel’s methods—specifically, its use 
of external software to decrypt the TPMs to obtain digital copies of the discs’ 
contents—to theft.  The Circuit Court maintained that VidAngel’s actions 
were “exactly like ‘breaking into a locked room’” for which VidAngel was 
never given the keys, “in order to obtain a copy of a [work].”192  The exemp-
tion applies only to authorized disc players, which are given the “keys” nec-
essary for lawfully decrypting the TPMs.193  Furthermore, nothing in the leg-
islative history suggests that VidAngel is exempt from circumvention 
liability simply because there are authorized ways to access the Studios’ 
                                                          
187. MDY Indus., L.L.C. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 629 F.3d 928, 953 n.16 (9th Cir. 2011); 
Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001).  
188. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863 (quoting Universal City, 273 F.3d at 444).  
189. Universal City, 273 F.3d at 444.  
190. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 863.  
191. Id.  
192. Id. at 864–65.  
193. Id.  
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works.194  Therefore, the Circuit Court found that VidAngel’s service was an 
unlawful violation of the anti-circumvention provision of the DMCA.195 
C. The Circuit Court Rejected VidAngel’s FMA Defense 
The Circuit Court rejected VidAngel’s FMA defense and found that 
“VidAngel does not stream from an authorized copy of the Studios’ motion 
pictures; it streams from the ‘master file’ copy it created by ‘ripping’ the 
movies from discs after circumventing their TPMs.”196  The Circuit Court 
concluded that statutory reading, statutory context, and legislative history 
support this interpretation.197  The most natural statutory reading, the Circuit 
Court reasoned, “is that the filtered performance or transmission itself must 
be ‘from’ an authorized copy of the motion picture,” not from an unauthor-
ized reproduction of the work.198  Furthermore, the FMA was created with 
the protection of copyright owners’ intellectual property rights in mind, and 
the statute itself states that it should not be construed or interpreted to imply 
further rights than those provided.199  Accepting VidAngel’s “interpretation 
of the statute—which permits unlawful decryption and copying prior to fil-
tering—would not preserve ‘protection of intellectual property rights,’” and 
would have lasting effects “on the existing copyright scheme.”200  Moreover, 
Senator Orrin Hatch, who sponsored the FMA, “stated that the [FMA] 
‘should be narrowly construed’ to avoid ‘impacting established doctrines of 
copyright’ law.”201  Senator Hatch insisted that any argument that a greater 
freedom of viewing and modification under the FMA requires the violation 
of copyright law protections “‘should be rejected as counter to legislative 
                                                          
194. Id. at 865.  
195. Id.   
196. Id. at 860.  
197. Id. at 857–60.  
198. Id. at 858; see 17 U.S.C. § 110 (2005).  
199. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 858–59.  
200. Id.  
201. Id. at 859–60.  
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intent or technological necessity.’”202  In their statements, Senator Hatch and 
the House of Representatives collectively identified ClearPlay’s business as 
a model that was intended to be protected by the FMA.203  Huntsman, the 
court argued, is the only other case to construe the FMA in a similar context 
and supports this interpretation.204 
D. The Circuit Court Rejected VidAngel’s Fair Use Defense 
The Circuit Court further rejected VidAngel’s fair use affirmative de-
fense to copyright infringement after reviewing the fair use factors.205  
VidAngel acknowledged that the second and third fair use factors—“the na-
ture of the copyrighted work” and “the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole”206—weighed 
against it because its filtered versions of the works were used for entertain-
ment, and kept a substantial portion of the original work intact.207  VidAngel 
claimed, however, that the District Court abused its discretion as to the first 
and fourth fair use factors.208  Ultimately the Circuit Court disagreed, holding 
that the first factor—“the purpose and character of the use”209—weighed 
against VidAngel because its omission of content from the Studios’ original 
works did not add anything new to the works and was not transformative.210  
VidAngel’s policy of simply omitting scenes and dialogue did not change 
the expression, meaning, or message of the films, and therefore, VidAngel 
                                                          
202. Id.  
203. Id. at 860.  
204. Id.; see also H.R. Rep. No. 109–33, pt. 1, at 70 (2005); Derivative Rights, Moral 
Rights, and Movie Filtering Technology: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, 
and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) (ClearPlay CEO tes-
timony).  See generally Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. CIV.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 
1993421, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005).  
205. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 860–62.  
206. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1992).  
207. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 860–62.  
208. Id. at 860.  
209. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
210. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 860–62.  
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failed to meet its burden as to the first factor.211  The Circuit Court also found 
that VidAngel failed to meet its burden as to the fourth factor—“the effect 
of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work”212—because its “service [is] an effective substitute for [the Studios’] 
unfiltered works” and acts as a replacement in the market.213 
E. VidAngel Was Enjoined from Continuing Its Filtering Services 
Having found that VidAngel failed in its fair use and FMA defenses 
against the Studios’ copyright infringement and DMCA violation claims, the 
Circuit Court next considered whether it was appropriate to affirm the Dis-
trict Court’s preliminary injunction against VidAngel.214  The Circuit Court 
found that refusing to grant an injunction against VidAngel would cause ir-
reparable harm to the Studios because “VidAngel’s service undermines the 
value of the Studios’ copyrighted works . . . and their goodwill and negoti-
ating leverage with licensees.”215  The Circuit Court also found that the bal-
ance of equities tipped in favor of the Studios because, firstly, VidAngel’s 
illegal activities do not merit equitable protection, and secondly, the financial 
hardship VidAngel would face as a result of being forced to cease its illegal 
activities pale in priority to the exclusive rights of copyright ownership and 
the protection of intellectual property rights.216  Finally, the Circuit Court 
found that a preliminary injunction against VidAngel was in the public in-
terest because “‘the public has a compelling interest in protecting copyright 
owners’ marketable rights to their work[s] and the economic incentive to 
continue creating television programming’ and motion pictures.”217 
 
 
                                                          
211. Id.  
212. 17 U.S.C. § 107.  
213.  VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 861.  
214. Id. at 860–62.  
215. Id. at 865–66.  
216. Id. at 866–67.  
217. Id. at 867.  
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VI. VIDANGEL’S SERVICES ARE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSE OF 
COPYRIGHT LAW, THE ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISION OF THE 
DMCA, AND THE FMA 
A. Filtering Is a Red Herring 
VidAngel’s Chief Executive Officer, Neal Harmon, insists that VidAn-
gel will aggressively pursue an appeal, if necessary, and has vowed to use 
“the $10 million reaped in a crowdfunding campaign to fight the case all the 
way to the Supreme Court.”218  VidAngel has framed this issue as Hollywood 
studios lashing out at a family-friendly filtering service.219  However, “the 
[S]tudios have repeatedly made it clear that [] filtering is not the issue,”—
the issue is “the unauthorized streaming and [] protection circumvention” of 
copyrighted works.220  In a joint statement, the Studios addressed this red 
herring, stating that “[t]his case was never about filtering.  The [Circuit] 
Court recognized that the Family Movie Act does not provide a defense to 
VidAngel’s infringing acts of ripping, copying and streaming copyrighted 
movies and TV shows.”221  Indeed, “[r]emove the filtering from [this] case 
and it’s hard to imagine that [a] film studio[] would allow a streaming service 
to ‘buy’ and ‘buy back’ [its] DVDs in this manner unchallenged.”222  In fact, 
this battle is not just between VidAngel and a handful of large Hollywood 
companies, it is far more reaching than that.  This case is about creators and 
contributors of all varieties and sizes who rely on the protection of copyright 
law and the current interpretation of the FMA to make a living and invest in 
future works.223  It is about the “writers, musical composers and recording 
                                                          
218. Gene Maddaus, Judge Orders VidAngel to Shut Down, VARIETY (Dec. 12, 2016, 7:15 
PM), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/vidangel-shut-down-copyright-violation-1201940368/ 
[https://perma.cc/BY3V-B67T]; Gene Maddaus, Facing a Shutdown Order, VidAngel Will Start 
Making Movies, VARIETY (Dec. 13, 2016, 8:38 PM), http://variety.com/2016/biz/news/vidangel-
studio-fight-supreme-court-injunction-1201941655/ [https://perma.cc/YAS7-KQCG].  
219. Jonathan Bailey, VidAngel: It’s Not About Filtering, PLAGIARISMTODAY (Jan. 12, 
2017), http://www.plagiarismtoday.com/2017/01/12/vidangel-important-case-dont-know 
[https://perma.cc/52AN-M9RG].  
220. Id.  
221. Maddaus, Judge Orders VidAngel to Shut Down, supra note 219.  
222. Bailey, supra note 220.  
223. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellees at 1–3, 
Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).  
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artists, journalists, documentarians and filmmakers, graphic and visual art-
ists, photographers and software developers,” and every freelance and small 
business copyright owner affected by the unauthorized use of his or her 
work.224  If VidAngel’s methods were allowed to obtain legitimacy, the 
availability of unlicensed, less stringent methods of accessing copyrighted 
works would undermine the legitimate system in place. 
B. VidAngel Misinterprets the FMA 
The crux of VidAngel’s misunderstanding of the FMA lies in its belief 
that once it purchases an authorized copy of a work, it is authorized to use it 
however it chooses.225  This is not the correct interpretation of the FMA.226  
The possession or purchase of an authorized copy of work does not authorize 
a party to subsequently reproduce fixed copies or publicly perform and dis-
tribute the works, as VidAngel did.227  Importantly, the Studios purposefully 
placed TPMs on their discs to prevent this type of unauthorized control or 
access to the works.228  VidAngel has admitted that it decrypts these protec-
tion measures, which is a violation of the DMCA, and stores unauthorized 
fixed copies of the original works on its servers for later distribution to the 
public via streaming.229  Moreover, VidAngel has admitted that the Studios 
have declined to grant it licenses to copy and stream the Studios’ works.230  
Its argument rests on the proposition that “because it has received an implied 
permission to view the content on a DVD” as a lawful purchaser, it also has 
permission to circumvent the access control measures on the discs as it sees 
fit.231  This is not the case.  VidAngel has neither received permission to 
circumvent the TPMs on the Studios’ works, nor does the FMA exempt this 
                                                          
224. Id. at 1.  
225. Id. at 6–8.  
226. Id.  
227. Id. at 6–7.  
228. Id. 
229. Id. at 15–16.  
230. Id. at 26.  
231. Id.  
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DMCA violation in any implied form.232  Allowing VidAngel’s interpreta-
tion to survive “would create a giant loophole in copyright law, sanctioning 
infringement so long as it filters some content and a copy of the work was 
lawfully purchased at some point.”233  As the Circuit Court pointed out, “vir-
tually all piracy of movies originates in some way from a legitimate copy.  If 
the mere purchase of an authorized copy alone precluded infringement lia-
bility under the FMA, the statute would severely erode the commercial value 
of the public performance right in the digital context.”234  In fact, VidAngel 
is not under attack for providing filtered movies, but for operating an unli-
censed streaming service that makes unauthorized fixed reproductions and 
public performances of other creators’ works in violation of their exclusive 
rights.235 
C. VidAngel’s Proclaimed Pure Intentions Are Irrelevant to 
Copyright Law 
VidAngel CEO Neal Harmon insists that VidAngel fights for parents’ 
rights to control what their children see in the privacy of their own homes.236  
But whether or not VidAngel believes its cause is wholesome is irrelevant to 
copyright law.  In Clean Flicks of Colo., the court addressed a similar argu-
ment from defendants concerning their service: 
The accused parties make much of their public policy argument 
and have submitted many communications from viewers express-
ing their appreciation for the opportunity to view movies in the 
setting of the family home without concern for any harmful ef-
fects on their children.  This argument is inconsequential to cop-
yright law and is addressed in the wrong forum.  This Court is not 
free to determine the social value of copyrighted works.  What is 
                                                          
232. Id. at 27.  
233. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 2017).  
234. Id.  
235. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 5–6.  
236. Gene Maddaus, Appeals Court Rejects VidAngel’s Bid to Overturn Injunction, 
VARIETY (Aug. 24, 2017, 10:39 AM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/vidangel-injunction-up-
held-appeals-court-1202538011/ [https://perma.cc/SC99-XNKT].  
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protected are the creator’s rights to protect its creation in the form 
in which it was created.237 
VidAngel’s consumer demand argument—that families and supporters 
of VidAngel have shown desire for a filtering service238—has been previ-
ously dismissed by other courts in other cases: 
Stripped to its essence, defendant’s “consumer protection” argu-
ment amounts to nothing more than a bald claim that defendant 
should be able to misappropriate plaintiffs’ property simply be-
cause there is a consumer demand for it.  This hardly appeals to 
the conscience of equity.239 
Despite VidAngel’s assertion that it is an innocent supplier of clean 
content in response to a market demand for family-friendly works, it never-
theless unlawfully profits from the creative works and goodwill of others.  It 
thieves with good intention, it claims, filling a market gap that it has no legal 
right to fill.  Market demand for a good or service does not justify illegal 
activity, and the benevolent thief is still a thief.   
D. VidAngel Failed to Seek Exemption for its Services Through the 
Triennial Rulemaking Process 
The triennial rulemaking process was introduced in 2000 as the “Con-
gressionally authorized regulatory mechanism for a proprietor of new tech-
                                                          
237. Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1240 (D. Colo. 
2006).  
238. Todd Spangler, Legally Embattled VidAngel Movie-Streaming Site Raises $10 Million 
From Fans, VARIETY (Nov. 10, 2016), http://variety.com/2016/digital/news/vidangel-raises-10-
million-studio-copyright-lawsuit-1201914823/ [https://perma.cc/6W9J-XXEF] (“According to 
VidAngel, nearly 40,000 customers have donated to its legal defense fund, and a total of 7,553 
individuals invested in the mini IPO.  About 8,000 customers have written letters to federal district 
court hearing the case explaining why movie filtering is important to them, according to the com-
pany.  The company touts the support of several religious, conservative and parents’ organiza-
tions.”).  
239. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).  
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nology or an individual user to seek a lawful exemption to the anti-circum-
vention provisions of the DMCA.”240  These proceedings permit “the Librar-
ian of Congress . . . to grant limited exemptions every three years to ensure 
that the public can still engage in fair and other non-infringing uses of 
works.”241  The DVD CCA and AACS LA, as the creators and licensors of 
the CCS and AACS technologies that encrypt DVDs and Blu-ray discs, have 
participated in every triennial proceeding since the launch of their respective 
technologies.242  VidAngel, on the other hand, has never participated in any 
of these proceedings, nor requested an exemption that would apply to its ser-
vice.243  If VidAngel sought to create an exemption for its services, it could 
have exercised this avenue.  However, VidAngel failed to utilize the 
DMCA’s recognized process, and instead claimed an exemption that was 
almost certainly not created with the intention of protecting this type of ser-
vice from circumvention liability. 
E. An Alternative: The ClearPlay Model 
If VidAngel intends to survive this latest injunction, perhaps it should 
consider changing its filtering business model.  The FMA expressly exempts 
from liability (1) “individuals who [filter] limited portions of films that they 
are viewing in their homes,” and (2) “companies who create and provide 
software or technology to facilitate such activities.”244  As discussed in Part 
II.C, the FMA was enacted in the wake of litigation against two filtering 
companies, CleanFlicks and ClearPlay,245 and ultimately carved out a narrow 
exception “to insulate ClearPlay and similar businesses from copyright lia-
bility.”246  Like VidAngel, CleanFlicks filtered out objectionable content by 
                                                          
240. Brief of DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. and Advance Access Content System 
License Administrator, LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21, Disney 
Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).  
241. Id. at 20.  
242. Id. at 21.  
243. Id.  
244. Peter S. Menell, Knowledge Accessibility and Preservation Policy for the Digital Age, 
44 HOUS. L. REV. 1013, 1062 (2007).  
245. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 23.  
246. Menell, supra note 245, at 1062.  
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purchasing DVDs at retail before creating fixed copies of the edited works, 
and then distributed those copies to the public.247  The difference between 
CleanFlicks and VidAngel was that CleanFlicks fixed its copies in physical 
DVDs, whereas VidAngel fixed its copies in its online cloud.248  Another 
difference was that CleanFlicks sold and rented its filtered physical DVDs, 
whereas VidAngel streamed the filtered content from its server straight to 
the public.249  The court found that the FMA did not exempt CleanFlicks’s 
service from copyright infringement, and further enjoined CleanFlicks’s 
business, naming it illegitimate.250 
ClearPlay, on the other hand, provided DVD playback equipment that 
worked in conjunction with the authorized copies of the DVDs that 
ClearPlay customers had purchased themselves.251  ClearPlay did not create 
fixed copies of works, but rather offered equipment that filtered objectiona-
ble portions of the DVDs as they were played in the home of the purchaser.252  
ClearPlay won its battle against Hollywood studios in 2005 by distinguishing 
itself as the filtering model that neither circumvents access controls in viola-
tion of the DMCA, nor infringes on the exclusive rights of copyright owners 
by reproducing fixed copies or publicly performing the works.253  In support 
of the Studios, ClearPlay had a law professor at Georgetown University write 
an amicus brief distinguishing itself from VidAngel and its services:254 
                                                          
247. Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 23–24.  
248. Id.  
249. Id.  
250. Clean Flicks of Colo., 433 F. Supp. 2d at 1243–44.  
251. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 23–24.  
252. Id.  
253. Huntsman v. Soderbergh, No. CIV.A02CV01662RPMMJW, 2005 WL 1993421, at 
*1 (D. Colo. Aug. 17, 2005); Gene Maddaus, ClearPlay Is No Longer Offering Filtered Movies to 
Stream, VARIETY (Feb. 7, 2017, 3:02 PM), http://variety.com/2017/biz/news/clearplay-streaming-
new-releases-google-shutdown-1201980650/ [https://perma.cc/S8JQ-RQUJ].  
254. Herb Scribner, ClearPlay Says it Doesn’t Support VidAngel in Streaming Rights Case, 
DESERET NEWS (Feb. 23, 2017, 6:25 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/arti-
cle/865674005/ClearPlay-says-it-doesnt-support-VidAngel-in-streaming-rights-case.html 
[https://perma.cc/H7Q8-UJRQ].  
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As ClearPlay has demonstrated over 17 years, it is not necessary 
to circumvent an access control measure, or make unauthorized 
copies or public performances in order to provide families with 
effective filtering technology.  VidAngel’s misinterpretation of 
the FMA is simply unsupportable either by the plain language or 
the legislative history, and acceptance of VidAngel’s infringing 
technology would undercut those that have worked within the law 
to develop compliant technologies.255 
F. An Alternative: Legislative Support 
VidAngel contends that the legislative history of the FMA indicates 
that the FMA was not written so narrowly as to apply only to the filtering 
services that were in existence at the time it was drafted, but that it was writ-
ten to broadly encompass future filtering technology as well.256  In June 2017, 
Senator Hatch wrote a letter to Chris Dodd, chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Motion Picture Association of America, concerning the FMA: 
[The FMA] was intended to enable families to use filtering technology 
to screen out graphic violence, vulgarity, and explicit sexual content from 
movies and television shows.  Crucially, the [FMA] sought to balance the 
interests of families in screening out objectionable content with the rights of 
copyright holders.  It applies only to filtering technology used on authorized 
copies of movies and television shows, prohibits viewers from creating boot-
leg versions, and does not protect any conduct that impairs core copyright 
protections.257   
In a separate statement, Senator Hatch expressed his belief that it is 
“essential that we protect content creators’ intellectual property rights.”258  
Additionally, Senator Hatch noted that infringing transmissions of works are 
                                                          
255. Brief for ClearPlay, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs-Appellees at 15, Dis-
ney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-56843).  
256. See Brief for the Copyright Alliance, supra note 224, at 20–24.  
257. Letter from Orrin G. Hatch et al., U.S. Senator, Congress of the U.S., to Chris Dodd, 
Chairman and CEO, Motion Picture Ass’n of America (June 21, 2017), https://www.hatch.sen-
ate.gov/public/_cache/files/d30ba79d-537c-41f3-8933-2f69a7febae1/Filtering%20Letter_web-
site[1].pdf [https://perma.cc/CW3N-8A8T] [hereinafter Hatch Letter].  
258. Herb Schribner, Hatch on VidAngel’s Technology:  ‘I Want To Find A Way For Eve-
ryone To Win On This Issue’ (+video), Deseret News (June 21, 2017, 1:35 PM), 
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not rendered non-infringing by the FMA simply because they omit or filter 
portions of the original works.259  It is unlikely that Congress would have 
approved of filtering services at odds with the exclusive rights of copyright 
holders, since the FMA was “expressly designed not to affect a copyright 
owner’s” exclusive rights.260  As the Circuit Court noted, the FMA was cre-
ated with the protection of copyright owners’ intellectual property rights in 
mind—and the statute itself stated that nothing in its language should be con-
strued or interpreted to imply further rights than those provided.261 
In 2004, ClearPlay asked Congress to “clarify through appropriate leg-
islation that muting and skipping over copyrighted content, without making 
an unauthorized copy did not violate the Copyright Act.”262  Congress, in 
turn, enacted the FMA as part of the Family Entertainment and Copyright 
Act of 2005, to permit filtering in accordance with its terms.263  As a result 
of this legislation, the Huntsman court dismissed ClearPlay as a defendant, 
and kept CleanFlicks as party to the suit, which it eventually enjoined from 
continuing its infringing services.264  If VidAngel cannot convince a court of 
its interpretation of the FMA and copyright law, it is free to seek action from 
Congress as ClearPlay did over a decade ago, to include new filtering tech-
nologies that were not covered or comprehended by the FMA at the time it 
was written.265 
G. An Alternative: Content Production 
VidAngel could consider branching out to content production.  There 
is a gap in the market for cleaner content, evidenced by the many lawsuits 
launched by Hollywood studios against companies that offered these ser-
                                                          
259. 150 CONG. REC. 11,852, at S11,853 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 2004) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch).  
260. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d at 859.  
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vices.  VidAngel can capitalize on this demand by creating or producing con-
tent that conforms to its company goals.  Streaming sites like Netflix and 
Hulu offer original productions, and assuming VidAngel’s true intention is 
to provide wholesome entertainment to the world, it might consider produc-
ing films or series which provide cleaner content to viewers.  VidAngel 
seemingly contemplated this option in 2016, when its CEO Neal Harmon 
announced that “VidAngel Studios” would be launching in early 2017, “pro-
ducing ‘family friendly’ content.”266 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The Circuit Court properly applied the law to VidAngel’s case, and 
preserved the protection that copyright law was created to bestow upon cop-
yright owners and their creative works.  VidAngel’s services infringed on 
the Studios’ exclusive rights, and its circumvention of the access controls on 
the works allowed VidAngel to copy and reproduce content that rightfully 
belonged to the Studios.  This type of filtering and streaming cannot be al-
lowed to co-exist in contradiction to everything copyright law stands for.  
The Copyright Act and the DMCA, as previously noted, do not only protect 
industry giants like the Studios; they protect every artist, author, and content-
producer that strives to make a living and a career out of his or her own 
expressive works.  These works are extensions of their creators, and copy-
right law grants those creators the power to exercise control over how their 
works are used, copied, and reproduced.  It was the intention of copyright 
law and the DMCA to shield owners from the very actions that VidAngel 
sought to legitimize in this case.  While VidAngel attempted to liken itself 
to a harmless provider of cleaner content in response to a market demand for 
family-friendly works, the reality is that its methods amounted to glorified 
theft.  Popular demand for a service or a good does not justify unlawful ac-
tivity, and wholesome intentions do not absolve a thief of accountability.  
Streaming services like VidAngel cannot be permitted to siphon a profit from 
the creations and goodwill of others.  If VidAngel intends to survive as a 
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company, it needs to change its streaming service model or appeal to the 
legislature for modification of filtering rights under copyright law. 
 
